


# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

VOLUME 3

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

NUMBER 1



*The  
United States  
and  
Asia-Pacific  
Security*

*January 1998*

**U.S. FOREIGN POLICY**  
**A G E N D A**

*The United States and  
Asia-Pacific Security*

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

USIA ELECTRONIC JOURNALS

VOLUME 3 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 1998



*The United States is and will remain  
a Pacific power and a Pacific partner  
because we recognize that shared opportunities  
beckon to us and shared dangers imperil us.  
We are on the same side in the battle to build lasting prosperity,  
secure human dignity, and create a foundation  
for lasting human freedom.*

— Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
In remarks to Asia-Pacific Region Foreign Ministers,  
New York, September 23, 1997

The U.S. role in promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region is the subject of this journal. Senior officials from the State and Defense Departments provide an overview of U.S. policy toward the region, explore U.S. relations with Japan and Korea, and discuss China's non-proliferation record. A leading U.S. legislator outlines some congressional priorities in East Asia, and two prominent American scholars analyze the importance of Asian security to the United States and the impact of "track two" diplomacy in East Asia. Also included are a report on recent public opinion polls conducted jointly in the United States and Japan and a fact sheet describing U.S.-Asia-Pacific security alliances.

# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the  
U. S. Information Agency*

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## THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

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## ENSURING SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

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*An Interview with Kurt Campbell  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs*

*The United States must maintain “constant vigilance” and an “intensive dialogue” with Asia-Pacific nations because “the region as a whole is simultaneously stable and slightly insecure,” Campbell says.*

*Highlighting “the tremendous progress” these nations have made in the past 30 years, Campbell assesses the current state of U.S. relations with China, Japan, South Korea, the countries of Southeast Asia, and Australia in this interview with Contributing Editor Jacqui S. Porth.*

**QUESTION:** With the end of the Cold War, how has the U.S. relationship with Asia-Pacific nations changed?

**CAMPBELL:** The most important thing to keep in mind is that the Cold War ended almost 10 years ago, so I think it is no longer very important, or even descriptive, to talk about this as a post-Cold War world. Particularly in East Asia, the Cold War tended to obscure critical dynamics that have always existed in the region, but perhaps now these dynamics are more clear than ever.

We have the rise of another great power in our midst, China. We have the presence of one of our most critical allies in Japan. We still have a very dangerous division of the Korean Peninsula that requires determination and vigilance. We have a variety of security partners. We have powerful and dynamic economies in Southeast Asia. In fact, all throughout Asia we are experiencing uncertainty. All told, the challenges facing the United States in the region are, perhaps, more dynamic than any other place in the world.

And given that fact, our economic and commercial commitment — as well as issues such as non-proliferation and human rights — are more profound, and growing, in Asia than in any other region of the world.

**Q:** Why does the United States need to maintain a forward-deployed military presence in the region, and what will that deployment look like in five years, and in 10 years?

**CAMPBELL:** It has been said that security is the oxygen of the engine of dynamic economic and commercial growth in the Asia-Pacific region. And unlike Europe, where we have intricate and sophisticated security architecture that maintains peace and stability, the most important determinant of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region has been and continues to be the presence of large and substantial U.S. forces.

We are in the Asia-Pacific region, not as a favor to Asia, but because it is in our interest. We believe that our forces in Asia allow us to maintain a strong and secure partnership with Japan. They deter aggression on the Korean Peninsula. They serve as a useful mechanism to engage China. And our military presence is a reminder to all those in the region that the United States is not an ephemeral or transitional actor in the Asia-Pacific, but we are a fundamental player and will continue to have interests there.

During the Cold War we had over 150,000 troops in the region: soldiers, sailors, and marines. Currently, we have about 100,000, and in our most recent public statements, both in the East Asia Strategy Report and the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was chaired by Defense Secretary Cohen, one of the conclusions was that 100,000 continues to be about the right number.

We have stated on a variety of occasions that when there are important strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region, then we will adjust our forces accordingly. So it is difficult to predict the future,

but I think one thing that we always try to make clear is that our forces are in the region because we are accepted in the region. We are not an imperial force, we are not an occupation force. We are a security partner. So we remain because we have strong support within the region.

**Q:** What is Russia's role in the Asia-Pacific and how can the United States and Russia cooperate and work together to promote regional stability?

**CAMPBELL:** Russia has not been a very active player in the Asia-Pacific region over the past several years, but it is a mistake to believe that Russia's interest lies exclusively in the European theater. Russia has begun to reemerge as a player in the Asia-Pacific region in the past several months, primarily in terms of its security dialogue and connections with China. But we believe that it is important for Russia to play a vital and constructive role in the region.

We have welcomed its assistance in encouraging North Korea to participate in the Four Party Talks. We welcomed the recent summitry between President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto which, hopefully, will lead to an improvement in Russo-Japanese relations, and, perhaps, even a peace treaty between the two. And we're hopeful that Russia will join the economic and political fora — such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum — that are so important in the region.

So for all these reasons, we would like to see Russia continue to play a role in the Asia-Pacific sphere. It will probably not be as great a diplomatic role as it seeks to play in the Middle East or Europe, but it can play a positive role here.

**Q:** What will be the effect on the Asia-Pacific region, and on U.S. policy, as China continues to grow as a major force and a major player?

**CAMPBELL:** Again, it's not just the magnitude of China's power. It is the character of its power. So I think the United States has made very clear that we have an interest in a strong, secure, stable, and

prosperous China. We welcome China's emergence in the international arena as a major, perhaps even a great power.

We want that ascension to be one in which China works to preserve and promote regional stability, plays by the rules of international commerce, and understands the vital correlations between domestic vitality and international behavior. I believe, personally, that our engagement policy is designed to create incentives for China to be a useful, strong, secure and dynamic player in the international environment. No one can predict with any certainty what China's future political character will be. However, I think you can make a powerful argument that the best way to create incentives and encouragement for China to play a positive role is through a policy of engagement.

**Q:** Do you see the Taiwan Strait situation as a possible serious threat to future stability in the region?

**CAMPBELL:** I think we are always concerned about the cross-straits situation. Obviously, the United States adheres to the Three Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, and we believe that that provides a framework for a useful U.S. approach to the region as a whole. We support cross-straits dialogue. We would like to see those talks resume, and we believe that China should continue to engage with Taiwan in a peaceful nature and should renounce the use of force. And, indeed, both sides should refrain from provocative actions which needlessly inflame the other.

**Q:** Why does the U.S. view its security relationship with Japan, as you have said, as "the most important pillar of peace and stability in the region?"

**CAMPBELL:** Japan provides a vehicle and a strong support for the U.S. forward presence in the region. The United States and Japan, working together, play a powerful, and I think, very positive role in promoting peace and stability.

And the overall implications of the security dialogue and the Defense Guidelines Review that

has just been completed between the United States and Japan are to create a security and political partnership that is viable for the 21st Century. That partnership is designed to promote peace and stability and to engage China in order to create a peaceful environment in which there is a sense that the United States will be an enduring player in the Asia-Pacific region.

**Q:** What problems does the United States face in preserving its relationship with Japan while at the same time working to develop a constructive relationship with China?

**CAMPBELL:** I think that it is a challenge that requires a very dynamic and creative diplomacy. We have tried to make clear that the U.S.-Japan relationship is completely open. If China wants to participate and have formal dialogue among the United States and Japan and China, we would be willing to do so.

I think that we have stated all along that the three great nations of the Asia-Pacific region — the United States, Japan and China — must have more dialogue, must have better contacts among the three, and that if the United States has good relations with China and the United States has good relations with Japan, that is not enough; it is also important that Japan and China improve their relationship as well. So we don't see the engagement policy with China and the U.S.-Japan security partnership as incompatible. In fact, we see them as reinforcing.

**Q:** How do you see the Japan-China relationship evolving, and what is the United States doing to encourage that evolution?

**CAMPBELL:** We encourage it by taking every opportunity to urge China and Japan to work together toward future goals that are in the interest of both, such as the promotion of peace and stability. We look for opportunities for concrete steps the three of us can take together, for more opportunities for greater dialogue, which we are taking advantage of within the "track two" arena. We also have talked intensively, both with China

and Japan, about how we see our role in the future in the Asia-Pacific region, and have encouraged them to do the same bilaterally. And I think we have seen some positive steps in that direction.

**Q:** How has Japan supported the Four Party Talks on Korea?

**CAMPBELL:** Japan has been very supportive of the Four Party Talks. They play an extremely vital diplomatic role. We often meet with the Japanese immediately before our Four Party Talk fora. The Japanese have played a useful role in the provision of some humanitarian assistance and they have their own, now separate, line of diplomatic activity with North Korea.

But I would say one of the most important secondary effects or implications of the Four Party Talks is the really rather dramatic improvement in the dialogue between South Korea and Japan. They are working much more closely together on the Korean Peninsula.

**Q:** How has the U.S.-ROK relationship benefited other nations in the Asia-Pacific region?

**CAMPBELL:** We recognize that the hope of our diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula rests on the reality of our deterrence, and that the United States and the Republic of Korea have a long partnership of working together on the Korean Peninsula, and that sense of constancy, I think, has been a reassuring factor to all in the region. I think we are entering a really delicate phase on the Korean Peninsula, and the U.S.-ROK partnership is, perhaps, more important than ever.

**Q:** What are the implications of future Korean reunification for regional stability and U.S. policy?

**CAMPBELL:** That's one of the most difficult questions to handle, and so much will be driven by the manner and means of reductions in tension on the Korean Peninsula. I will tell you that I think our overarching goals are to have a relationship with the Korean people that transcends the current division on the Korean Peninsula.

We believe that there will be important regional security dynamics that will keep the United States interested in being involved. Ultimately, that decision will be a decision for the Korean people together, but we are trying to look over the horizon and think about the common issues that have united us for these many years.

**Q:** I have seen Australia described as “the southern anchor” of the U.S. and allied strategic positions in Asia-Pacific region. What does that mean?

**CAMPBELL:** I know that expression has received quite bit of negative attention in China. The important thing is that the United States and Australia have an extremely close political and security partnership. It has been that way for years. I think our recent years have been among our best.

We are working very closely with Australia. We share common goals in Southeast Asia in terms of the integration of Indonesia, engaging China. And Australia is a big supporter of the U.S. forward presence and will continue to be so, I believe. And we continue to have strong overall interests in the maintenance of peace and stability. Our relationship with Australia is one of the linchpins of, again, our engagement in the region and we spend a lot time trying to nourish that more closely with our Australian friends and allies.

I think that relationship also helps Australia to be an interpreter and a helpful supporter of the United States in the region.

**Q:** What about U.S. initiatives with respect to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam?

**CAMPBELL:** In each of these countries, as you know, we have a variety of security initiatives. We have demining programs, which are important and will continue and grow in certain cases. We also have a powerful and dynamic commitment to POW (Prisoner-of-War) and MIA (Missing-in-Action) issues. And in each of these countries, in varying degrees, we’re also interested in beginning a subtle and careful and cautious military-to-military dialogue. So we think that is important as

well, but that has to go slowly within the context of domestic limitations in the United States and in those countries.

**Q:** How important are countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand to the United States?

**CAMPBELL:** Very important. I think you will see the United States increasing its presence, increasing its opportunities for training and access and other kinds of things in Southeast Asia. And we consider that to be very important.

**Q:** What, if anything, is on the agenda for the United States and Burma, or Myanmar?

**CAMPBELL:** On the security front, not much. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has said: look, let us deal with Burma in the Asian way, let us work with them in the context of ASEAN. Well, okay. You have your opportunity now. Let’s see if you make any more progress.

**Q:** Do you think the issue of defense burdensharing is in the forefront of congressional thinking about the Asia-Pacific region?

**CAMPBELL:** I do. In my discussions with members of Congress, they have all raised questions both about Japan and (South) Korea. Certainly, in Japan we have probably the most generous burdensharing and support for U.S. forward-deployed forces of anywhere in the world. Currently, the Japanese spend about \$100,000 a year per soldier, sailor, and marine in Japan. That’s a lot of money. That’s a substantial commitment.

**Q:** How many U.S. forces do we have there?

**CAMPBELL:** About 47,000.

**Q:** What is the key security challenge that the United States faces in the Asia-Pacific region in the Clinton administration’s second term?

**CAMPBELL:** Managing the implications of Russia’s emergence from the former Soviet Union into a sort of market democracy was one of the biggest

challenges of the administration's first term.

A major challenge for the second term is to create the mechanism, the framework, for helping to integrate China into the international community. And there is so much associated with that in terms of our security framework and our political interactions. So I think that will be very important.

**Q:** As you look down the road, what are some of the emerging threats in the Asia-Pacific region?

**CAMPBELL:** Non-proliferation concerns, obviously, on the Korean Peninsula. We would like to see dialogue across the Taiwan Straits. That issue clearly has the potential to create uncertainty and instability. We are watching carefully the economic volatility in the region with the clear understanding that that can sometimes lead to political or security concerns as well.

I think, by and large, the region as a whole is simultaneously stable and slightly insecure. And that there is a sense that this tremendous progress that Asia has made in the last 30 years can be upset with very small steps. And so constant vigilance, intensive dialogue, these are things that, hopefully, will prevent the emergence of crises that threaten our mutual stability. ●

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## JAPAN AND KOREA: KEY U.S. SECURITY PARTNERS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

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*By Charles Kartman  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*

*Japan and Korea are “key partners” in the ongoing U.S. effort to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, says Kartman. The U.S.-Japan security alliance, he says, serves as a “stabilizing influence” in the region that “remains as vital as ever” in the post-Cold War era. And the historic Four-Party Talks — involving the United States, North Korea, South Korea, and China — offer “the best chance since...1953 to achieve a reduction of tensions and a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.”*

From the earliest days of the Republic, the United States has focused its attention on the Pacific, and we will remain vigorously engaged in the Pacific region for the foreseeable future. In the post-World War II era, U.S. efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region have depended on a number of bilateral alliances with key partners in the region. Since the end of the Cold War, these relationships have not lost their relevance. Indeed, as we have worked with our allies to respond to changing circumstances, these alliances have demonstrated their continuing utility and importance.

The U.S.-Japan security alliance is crucial to U.S. engagement in the region. And the historic peace talks recently begun in Geneva offer the best chance since the conclusion of the Armistice in 1953 to achieve a reduction of tensions and a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

### **JAPAN**

The U.S.-Japan security alliance serves as the foundation of U.S. security policy in East Asia and the Pacific and of the U.S. military's forward deployment in the region.

The basic purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance has always been to ensure the security of our two countries, and in the nearly 40 years since the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was first signed in January 1960, the alliance has done precisely that. By ensuring the peace and stability

of Japan, as well as of the United States, the alliance binds our countries together in a productive, positive partnership and provides concrete, tangible benefits for both our peoples.

At the same time, the U.S.-Japan security alliance plays a much wider role. In the preamble to the Security Treaty, the United States and Japan recognized that they have a common interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. It is widely recognized throughout the region that the security alliance has, in fact, played a key role in maintaining stability and facilitating prosperity throughout East Asia and the Pacific.

The origins of the U.S.-Japan security alliance date from the time of the Cold War, and now that the Cold War has ended, some have suggested the alliance may be a relic of the past and have questioned the need for its continuation. Such sentiments could not be further from the truth. Although the Cold War is indeed over, the potential for crises and instability persists in the Asia-Pacific region, and the stabilizing influence of the security alliance remains as vital as ever. Nevertheless, the political and security environment in the region has continued to evolve, and the U.S.-Japan alliance must evolve as well to keep up with these changes.

President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto recognized this necessity at the time of the April 1996 Tokyo Summit, when they agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan

Defense Cooperation. This review was completed in September 1997, when the Security Consultative Committee issued new Guidelines. The aim of the new Guidelines is to enhance security cooperation between the United States and Japan and to create the basis for more effective and credible coordination under normal peacetime circumstances, in response to an armed attack against Japan, and in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Much work remains to be done to implement the Guidelines so that they can become the effective tool for enhancing the security alliance that they were intended to be. The governments of the United States and Japan are committed to implementing the Guidelines in a timely fashion and are working vigorously to accomplish this task.

Although the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation will enhance and reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan security alliance and make it better able to cope with the challenges of the evolving security situation in the region, they will not change its fundamental framework. The rights and obligations of either party under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements will not change either. In addition, Japan will continue to conduct all of its actions within the limits of its constitution and will maintain its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. The new Guidelines are not aimed at any other country.

The U.S.-Japan security alliance continues to enjoy the broad support of the people and the political leaders of both countries. The alliance also requires the continuing sacrifices of the American and Japanese people. We in the United States are grateful for the generous Host Nation Support that Japan provides to U.S. forces in Japan. At the same time, Japan enjoys the benefits of the sizable U.S. defense budget.

Additionally, the U.S. and Japanese governments recognize the burdens imposed on the Japanese people by the presence of U.S. military bases, particularly in Okinawa where these facilities are

highly concentrated. For this reason the two governments established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 1995 to study the question of consolidating, realigning, and reducing U.S. facilities in Okinawa consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The SACO Final Report, issued in December 1996, is a concrete plan and timetable for the return of approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa and for the adjustment of training and operational procedures of U.S. forces. We remain firmly committed to the implementation of the SACO Final Report.

## **KOREA**

For the past 44 years, the Korean Peninsula has been regarded as one of the most dangerous potential flashpoints in the world, a place where the threat of renewed warfare has never completely receded. U.S. security policy has focused on deterring potential aggression from the North, and the bedrock of that policy remains our firm security commitment to the South, embodied in the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. Roughly 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed in the ROK, and we maintain a regular schedule of exercises, conducted in a non-threatening manner, to help maintain readiness of U.S. and ROK forces. But as we maintain an effective deterrent capability, we and our South Korean ally have also sought to end the North's isolation and encourage it to undertake a more cooperative and constructive role in the international community.

The United States has long believed that the key to a reduction of tensions, and ultimately the realization of lasting peace, on the Korean Peninsula lies in productive dialogue and cooperation between the South and North. But, despite many initiatives over the years, sustained dialogue and cooperation have not emerged, and there has been little progress toward achieving peace. To achieve these goals, President Clinton, during a visit to the ROK in April 1996, and South Korean President Kim Young Sam jointly proposed Four Party Peace Talks involving the

United States, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the People's Republic of China. After many months of effort, the opening session of these talks took place December 9-10, 1997 in Geneva, Switzerland. Though likely to be a lengthy and difficult process, the Four Party Talks offer the best opportunity since the end of the Korean War to achieve a lasting peace.

Not very long ago, concerns over North Korea's unsafeguarded nuclear program and the North's announcement in March 1993 that it would abrogate its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty focused world attention and ignited fears that confrontation and conflict could again engulf the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK's announcement led the United States, after close consultations with our ROK ally and others in the international community, to initiate a bilateral dialogue with the DPRK in June 1993 aimed at addressing the nuclear issue. These efforts culminated in the October 1994 Agreed Framework, which laid out a series of steps to freeze existing North Korean nuclear activities, dismantle its present nuclear facilities, arrange for the safe storage and shipment out of that country of spent nuclear fuel that could be used to reprocess plutonium, and ultimately bring the DPRK into full compliance with its safeguard obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In return, a multinational consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, will provide two light-water reactors, which pose a significantly lower threat of proliferation problems.

As we seek to address the broader issues of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula through the Four Party Talks, the Agreed Framework provides for the development of improved bilateral political and economic relations between the U.S. and the DPRK. This improvement is to come as the Agreed Framework is implemented and as the DPRK addresses matters of concern to the United

States, including cooperation on the return of remains of persons unaccounted for from the Korean War and the issue of missile proliferation. There have now been four joint recovery operations involving U.S. and North Korean forces and the repatriation of remains believed to be those of Americans. DPRK development of missiles and sales of missiles and missile technology are of serious concern to the United States. We have held two rounds of talks with the DPRK on this issue — in April 1996 in Berlin and April 1997 in New York. Dates for a third round are currently under discussion but have not yet been set.

## **CONCLUSION**

Strong U.S.-ROK relations and a firm U.S. security commitment remain the keystone of our policy toward the Korean Peninsula. And success in the Four-Party process, through a series of steps to reduce tensions and to transform the status quo to a state of peace, is the path that can lead to the most significant changes in the DPRK's relations, not only with us, but with its neighbors, especially the ROK, and with others in the international community.

The implementation of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation and of the SACO Final Report will strengthen and invigorate our security alliance with Japan, and, with the continuing support of the U.S. and Japanese people, enable it to continue to play its crucial role in ensuring the stability and prosperity of both our countries, as well as of the entire Asia-Pacific region as we enter the 21st century.

Finally, it should be noted that our bilateral security relations with Japan and Korea have always been relevant to one another. The pattern of trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK consultation developed in recent years helps ensure that this will remain true in the future. ●

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## CHINA: A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO NON-PROLIFERATION

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*An Interview with Robert J. Einhorn  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation*

*“China realizes that its own interests are served by non-proliferation, and that’s why it has, over time, become a more and more responsible player,” says Einhorn. “It still has a long way to go” in some areas, he notes, but “we hope to see continuing improvement in China’s non-proliferation record.”*

*Einhorn was interviewed by Contributing Editor Jane Morse.*

**QUESTION:** As a nuclear state and major power in Asia, China is critical to the goal of ending the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. What moves has China made in this regard and what future steps does the United States hope China will take?

**EINHORN:** China, in the past several years, has taken a number of steps to demonstrate its commitment to non-proliferation — not just non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and missile delivery systems.

In 1992, China became a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). And in 1995 it supported making the NPT, which is the centerpiece of global non-proliferation efforts, permanent. It signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and became an original party to the CWC in April of this year. It is also a party to the Biological Weapons Convention.

So China, especially during the 1990s, has taken a variety of important steps to support non-proliferation agreements, and it also has cooperated with the United States in supporting non-proliferation goals in various regions of the world.

Most importantly, it worked with the United States to promote an effective solution to the North Korean nuclear problem in 1994. In that period, the North Koreans were intending to

withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We believed they had violated their commitments under the NPT, and we were trying to find a solution. The Chinese were effective behind the scenes in supporting a solution that we eventually reached with the North Koreans bilaterally in October 1994, which resulted in the end of the North Korean nuclear program.

**Q:** How has China’s attitude toward various arms control measures changed in the past decade? And in what ways has China become a constructive partner with regard to the arms control priorities of the Clinton administration?

**EINHORN:** China’s behavior has changed quite dramatically over the past several decades. During the 1960s, for example, it was the declared policy of China to support nuclear proliferation. The Chinese said that proliferation of nuclear capabilities would, and I quote, “break the hegemony of the superpowers.”

China has come a long way from the days when it actually favored proliferation. Now, we believe that China is seeing itself more as a major power with important responsibilities. It’s a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it’s one of the five nuclear weapons states, and it has come to realize that one of the important attributes of great power status is to abide by international non-proliferation norms. So we think that China is more and more becoming a responsible player.

But I have to say that China's evolution is not yet complete. It has made important progress, but in certain areas of proliferation, it is still engaged in activities that are problematic for us. For example, while its nuclear cooperation record with third parties has significantly improved, in the area of missile and chemical proliferation we still see problems. We don't believe that China is adequately controlling the export of dual-use chemical-related items. And some Chinese entities have actually contributed to Iran's chemical weapons program.

In the missile area, we see China exporting components and technology which are assisting both Pakistan and Iran in the acquisition of missiles.

So China has come a long way in the non-proliferation area and especially in the nuclear non-proliferation area. But it still has a way to go in some of the other areas.

**Q:** What effect do China's military and technology relations with Pakistan and Iran have on U.S. interests?

**EINHORN:** You have to look at the cases separately. We are terribly concerned about the behavior of Iran. It's an opponent of the Middle East peace process, it's a supporter of terrorism, it's seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and it has often taken a hostile attitude toward its neighbors. So we believe that any assistance to Iranian military programs is a mistake and can contribute to instability in the important Gulf region. And we have raised this with Chinese authorities on many occasions.

Pakistan, of course, is a friend of the United States, and we wish to have good bilateral relations with Pakistan. We also recognize China is a good friend of Pakistan, and we don't wish to interfere in any way with their close relationship. But we hope that the Chinese will recognize that their relationship with Pakistan needs to conform with international non-proliferation norms and that assisting such activities as Pakistan's missile program could lead to instability in the region and

could have a disruptive effect on the efforts of India and Pakistan to work out a rapprochement after 50 years of independence.

**Q:** What steps has China taken in this area with either Pakistan or Iran?

**EINHORN:** China has taken a number of steps. It has adopted a much more restrained and responsible approach to the export of nuclear equipment and technology. In the past, China had actually contributed to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program. That is to say it contributed to facilities in Pakistan that do not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or inspections. This has been a very unfortunate practice. But the Chinese committed in May 1996 not to provide any assistance to these unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. And we have no reason to conclude that they have violated this undertaking.

Also, the Chinese recently assured us — this was in connection with President Jiang Zemin's visit to Washington in October 1997 — that they were not going to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and that they would complete existing cooperative projects in a relatively short period of time. We think this was a very responsible step.

China also has taken steps to improve its policy related to export of chemical-related items. In May of 1997 the United States was compelled under its laws to impose trade sanctions against seven Chinese entities for contributing to Iran's chemical program. After these sanctions, we see evidence that the Chinese have taken steps to adopt more rigorous controls on their companies that export to Iran. So this is positive.

They also have taken some steps in the missile proliferation area, but these are more modest. One useful step is agreement to ban the export of any long-range ground-to-ground missiles. And we believe that China has not exported complete ground-to-ground missiles since making that agreement. We're concerned, however, that China continues to provide components and technology to both Pakistan and Iran.

**Q:** You said that China has agreed not to undertake any new arrangements with Iran, but will complete existing projects. How many projects exist and how damaging are they to non-proliferation interests?

**EINHORN:** We asked the Chinese, during the negotiations that preceded President Jiang's visit, to itemize precisely what ongoing projects they were involved in with Iran. They told us there were two existing projects; we evaluated them and they are very minor. We don't believe they raise proliferation concerns, and so we did not have any difficulty with the Chinese completing them in a relatively short period of time.

**Q:** What kinds of assurances has China given us regarding controls of nuclear technology and hardware to implement the 1985 U.S.-China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation?

**EINHORN:** The Chinese have taken a number of steps and provided a number of new assurances which provided justification in our view for President Clinton to go forward on October 29 to indicate that he would provide to the Congress the necessary certifications to bring the 1985 U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement fully into force. I'll enumerate quickly what those steps were.

One was the May 1996 pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. And, as I said, China appears to be taking this commitment very, very seriously.

Second, it undertook not to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete existing projects in a short period of time.

Third, it adopted a nuclear export control system, a nationwide comprehensive system that it never had before and that, for the first time, will give it the ability to control effectively both nuclear items and dual-use, nuclear-related items that go to foreign countries.

And fourth, it was important to us that China participate in multilateral nuclear export control deliberations. And on October 16, China became

a member of the NPT Exporters Committee — the so-called "Zangger Committee," which is a group of supplier states belonging to the NPT. This will help China become fully familiar with the nuclear export control policies and practices of the responsible supplier governments of the world. And I believe it will reinforce China's movement in a responsible direction.

**Q:** Why did it take so long to implement the 1985 U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement? How does the agreement benefit China and how does it benefit the United States?

**EINHORN:** After this agreement was negotiated and signed in 1985, we came across information that China was providing assistance to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program, thereby contributing to Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability. The Congress passed various laws — some in 1985, and some additional provisions after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 — that required the president to make several certifications if the administration wanted to implement this agreement.

Because of continuing Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program, no U.S. president had been able to make the necessary certifications for a long period of time. But this administration, given the priority it attaches to non-proliferation, decided to make an effort to persuade China to alter its behavior and give us the necessary assurances. We've made a major effort for the past two and a half years to persuade the Chinese of the wisdom of this course. And we think on the eve of the recent summit meeting in Washington, we were able to achieve what we needed.

We believe there will be substantial benefits for both the United States and China in implementing this agreement. For the United States, an important benefit is the improved non-proliferation behavior we've been able to achieve with China.

The agreement is only a framework. It enables U.S. companies to sell to China, but individual transactions have to be approved individually. So

if China does not live up to its commitments, we can cut off nuclear trade with China. So having this agreement in place will provide a continuing basis for us to monitor and influence Chinese behavior. That's an important benefit for the United States. Also, U.S. companies will, for the first time, have an opportunity to sell nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel and other nuclear products to China. The Chinese have vast energy plants, including very large nuclear plants. This is a potentially very lucrative market for the nuclear industry.

And there could also be important environmental benefits. It's widely understood that nuclear energy is very clean. You don't create the pollutants that are created when you burn fossil fuels. To the extent that China takes advantage of safe, environmentally sound U.S. reactors, this could be an important environmental step as well.

So for us, we believe there are substantial benefits. For the Chinese, of course, they get the opportunity to purchase and import the best, safest, most advanced nuclear reactor designs in the world, which are American-designed plans.

**Q:** Are there any estimates about how much money we're talking about, what this means to U.S. industry? What other countries are already selling nuclear technology to China?

**EINHORN:** Right now you have France, Russia, and Canada already agreeing to sell nuclear reactors to China. But so far, China has not had the right to buy American. It's clear that one of the reasons they were prepared to make these new non-proliferation commitments is that they saw real benefit in buying from the United States.

How big the market is, what we could expect in the way of U.S. nuclear sales to China — it's hard to predict. It will be up to the Chinese and to the American companies, as well as their foreign competitors, to determine what kind of a market there will be for American goods.

**Q:** You discussed China's changing behavior with Iran and Pakistan, but are there other countries to which China has sold weapons?

**EINHORN:** Interestingly, China has not been engaged in sales to a vast number of countries in this area. Often you see public comments from various sources suggesting that China is an indiscriminate seller of arms and destabilizing technologies. In fact, China's sales that we have found questionable have been confined to a relatively small number of recipients. We hope that China continues to improve its record and that we don't see any indication that China is selling its arms and technology more broadly.

**Q:** The media has questioned the Chinese government's response that it did not know about certain sales by private companies. The argument is made that there really are no private companies in China, so the Chinese government can't claim it did not know about certain sales to foreign countries. How would you address that?

**EINHORN:** I have followed Chinese behavior in this area very closely for a number of years, and it is entirely plausible to me that there are activities that go on that are not approved and are not even known about by the central government. A case in point was the sale several years ago of ring magnets, relatively unsophisticated pieces of equipment, to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program. The more we looked at this, the more it became very believable that the Chinese entity involved was operating on its own without government oversight. The commercial value of the transfer was something less than \$70,000. These were general-purpose goods, but they nonetheless contributed to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program.

This is one reason why we have called for the strengthening of China's nuclear related export controls, because we wanted to remedy this kind of problem and to ensure that the governmental authorities have oversight over all exports that could contribute to proliferation.

**Q:** Would you discuss China's interests in the Middle East and how they affect China's non-proliferation efforts?

**EINHORN:** China has a great stake in stability in the Middle East. China has become a net importer of oil. It has growing energy needs; it will need to continue importing oil, including from the Persian Gulf. So it should not want to see instability in the Gulf region.

We have had concerns with the Chinese over the sale of conventional anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. We feel that this anti-ship cruise missile capability could contribute to an Iranian capability to destabilize the region, the ability to threaten shipping in the Gulf.

So we have made this a high priority and we've recently seen signs that the Chinese understand our concerns and hopefully will be responsive to them.

**Q:** How would you characterize China's self-interest in complying with non-proliferation issues?

**EINHORN:** I think China's more responsible approach to non-proliferation is a function of its appreciation that its interests are not served by having more countries, including countries neighboring China, acquire these destabilizing capabilities. It no doubt feels strongly that there should not be nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and in other areas near China.

I think China realizes that its own interests are served by non-proliferation and that's why it has, over time, become a more and more responsible player. This evolution is not complete; China still has a long way to go in areas such as missile proliferation and chemical proliferation. But the United States will be working with China very closely and gauging China, monitoring Chinese behavior, and where we see deficiencies, we will bring those forcefully to the attention of China's leaders. And we hope to see continuing improvement in China's non-proliferation record. ●

## CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITIES IN EAST ASIA

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*By Representative Doug Bereuter  
Chairman, House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific*

*Reflecting the views of many in Congress, Bereuter says the United States must sustain its security commitments to East Asia and increase its efforts, both public and private, to promote economic progress in the region. At the same time, he notes, "we must not neglect our historic commitment to the fundamental principles of democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights."*

Events in East Asia have been in the forefront of U.S. attention in recent months. The Hong Kong reversion of July 1, 1997 was an historic event for the people of China and was one of the most widely observed and reported events of the past year. In October, Chinese President Jiang Zemin completed his first official state visit to the United States. On the Korean Peninsula, the United States has become the driving force behind the massive international relief effort designed to prevent widespread famine in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). And in Southeast Asia, the United States is actively seeking to advance the cause of democracy and human rights in Cambodia, Burma, and elsewhere. On each of these issues, Congress has been quick to share its views.

While the Constitution invests the President with primary responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, there is no question that Congress plays a major role in shaping U.S. policy. On Asian issues, Congress generally has supported U.S. economic and military engagement. It has, however, taken issue with the Clinton Administration in a number of instances where members believe greater emphasis on democracy and human rights is necessary. Congress also tends to be more aggressive in publicly confronting those nations that engage in the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Certainly, congressional attitudes toward Asia have been changing rapidly since the end of the Cold

War. The Cold War so defined U.S. relations with Asia that our country has had difficulty conceiving of an alternative way of structuring those relations. As a result, when I first became Chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in January 1995, I sought a set of guiding principles around which to structure congressional policy toward Asia. I settled upon three objectives that I believe should govern our approach to Asia. I believe it is absolutely critical that we keep each of these principles in mind; if we carelessly neglect any one of these objectives, we risk significantly undermining our nation's interests in the region.

First, the United States must sustain its security commitments to the region. America has a vital interest in the peace and stability of Asia, and we have forward-based 100,000 military personnel to ensure that our security commitments are honored. This American commitment has permitted nearly the entire Asia-Pacific region to avoid conflicts and focus its resources and efforts on economic development. The United States has excellent friends and allies in Asia. We need to continue to work closely with our allies to achieve our common security objectives.

Second, the United States must increase its efforts, both public and private, to promote its economic interests in Asia. This means not only focusing both public and private resources on our economic and commercial relationships in Asia, but also finding ways to augment those resources. Despite

the recent economic turbulence, economic opportunities abound in Asia. Taking advantage of these opportunities not only will promote prosperity at home by providing jobs for Americans, but also will promote prosperity for citizens of Asia.

Third, we must not neglect our historic commitment to the fundamental principles of democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights. Any congressional policy that is merely based on realpolitik and is devoid of moral grounding will ultimately not sustain the support of the American people. At the same time, we must seek to employ a more effective regional- and country-nuanced array of multilateral policies, programs, and techniques to foster this objective in the region.

I believe there is broad support in Congress for these three objectives. It is nonetheless true that putting these objectives into practice often proves difficult. Particularly with regard to the People's Republic of China (PRC), but also with other nations in Asia as well, this was the focus of considerable congressional debate in 1997.

## **CHINA**

Congressional criticism of China during the past year increased in intensity and diversity. The annual summer debate over Most Favored Nation tariff status ended with the Congress once again allowing the extension of MFN to China. However in November 1997, continuing frustration with the PRC's human rights and missile proliferation activities resulted in the House of Representatives considering a wide-ranging package of nine separate legislative initiatives. These measures included human rights legislation dealing with prison labor exports, coercive abortion practices, and religious intolerance. In addition, the package addressed security concerns including China's missile proliferation activities, the activities of the People's Liberation Army, and Taiwan's need to defend itself against possible Chinese aggression. Other resolutions focused on increasing the funding for

Radio Free Asia and restricting multinational development bank loans to the PRC. Consideration of this series of bills was deferred until after the visit of President Jiang Zemin, but the effort was designed to influence President Clinton's priorities and discussions at the summit.

In general, the package of legislative resolutions adopted a dual approach in registering congressional concern regarding Chinese behavior: (1) nonbinding, "sense of Congress" language that identifies specific areas of concern, and (2) a more assertive, sanction-oriented position that would require specific actions, such as the denial of visas to individuals who are associated with China's one child policy or with religious repression. Of course, since these resolutions were passed during the closing days of the congressional session, none of these initiatives has become law.

Thus far it appears that the Senate is not inclined to pursue this type of approach; of course, the President always could veto such measures. While I believe some provisions in this legislative package were questionable in accuracy and were unnecessarily and inappropriately confrontational, the votes taken by the House of Representatives do reflect a general dissatisfaction with the status quo. Similar efforts are likely to be made in the future.

## **NORTH KOREA**

There is no more volatile and dangerous spot in Asia, perhaps in the world, than North Korea. Few countries have experienced the economic and societal disintegration that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is now facing. Decades of self-imposed isolation have resulted in a North Korean regime that appears paranoid and quite capable of lashing out in violence toward the South. If the American military is to be tested in the next few years, that test is quite likely to come on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, it is incumbent upon Congress to be very careful in dealing with North Korea.

The Clinton Administration's policy toward North Korea seems to be designed to prevent a complete

collapse of the North Korean economy, a strategy which, in theory, would decrease the likelihood of Pyongyang launching a desperation military offensive toward the South. To that end, the Administration has supported carefully measured international food assistance efforts and promoted the international framework to provide the North with safe nuclear energy; this, it is hoped, will persuade the DPRK to cap its nuclear weapons program. As a result, we face the ironic situation where North Korea, with which the United States technically remains at war, has become the largest U.S. aid recipient in East Asia.

Congress tends to view the Administration's North Korea policy as a high risk gamble that requires careful oversight. Congress has been particularly careful not to permit North Korea to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea. And, while no one wants to deny food to starving women and children, there is a great deal of skepticism about Pyongyang's motives. Congress repeatedly has pressed for guarantees that any delivery of food aid meets with the support of our South Korean allies, that food aid is not diverted to the North Korean military, that North Korean military food stockpiles have been tapped to respond to the famine, and that adequate numbers of international monitors are permitted to verify the delivery of food to its intended recipients.

With regard to the efforts to cap North Korea's nuclear program by assisting in the construction of safe, light-water nuclear reactors, the Congress also remains skeptical and reluctant to fully fund the Administration's request. Increasingly, questions are being raised as to whether a North Korean economy that appears to some to be in the midst of a death spiral truly needs sophisticated nuclear power reactors.

## **SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Congressional attention toward Southeast Asia has focused primarily on the advancement of democratic values and the protection of human rights. There has been remarkable economic and political progress in Southeast Asia, although the

economic progress has suffered in recent weeks. In addition, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), which now encompasses almost all of Southeast Asia, has become an important force for stability and cooperation.

On the other hand, there have been a number of setbacks to the cause of democracy and human rights. The most prominent setback occurred with the July 8, 1997 coup in Cambodia, when Second Prime Minister Hun Sen seized control of the government and routed the military and political forces of First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh. Quite properly, the Clinton Administration terminated aid to the government of Cambodia and worked at the United Nations to ensure that Hun Sen's regime not be officially recognized and credentialed. But the State Department has refused to recognize Hun Sen's actions as a coup, realizing, of course, that such a determination would trigger sanctions that would further limit U.S. flexibility in pursuing foreign policy goals. But in the eyes of Congress and the world, a coup obviously occurred, and both the House of Representatives and the Senate have passed resolutions stating that conclusion. In addition, an amendment that I authored to the Fiscal Year 1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act effectively prevents the Clinton Administration from resuming aid to the government of Cambodia.

The Congress also has expressed strong views regarding the human rights abuses of the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) regime in Burma. As a result of an amendment to the FY 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act offered by then-Senator William Cohen and Senator Dianne Feinstein, sanctions on new investments are to be imposed if the President finds that human rights conditions in Burma have deteriorated. In general, I am not a supporter of economic sanctions, for they rarely achieve their stated objective. Nonetheless, the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment was signed into law, and conditions unquestionably deteriorated last year as the SLORC arrested supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and head of the opposition National League for Democracy party.

As a result, I argued that the President had no option under the law but to impose sanctions. Belatedly, sanctions were imposed on April 22, 1997.

Some in Congress also have tried to urge Indonesia to improve human rights conditions, particularly in East Timor. For example, during the debate in the House of Representatives over the State Department authorization for FY 1998, Representative Patrick Kennedy offered an amendment that was highly critical of abuses by the Indonesian military in East Timor. But while the Indonesian military admittedly has engaged in inappropriate behavior, it is also true that separatist forces in East Timor have engaged in acts of terror and wanton violence. Representative Kennedy's amendment was modified to include a condemnation of the continued violence by separatist forces. I also vigorously disagree with those who argue that we should end our military-to-military contacts with the Indonesian Army. Military education programs and other such contacts can have an enormous beneficial impact in terms of improving human rights practices in the military and building strong bilateral relations.

#### **LIKELY FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY**

Certainly the Congress will continue to closely follow events in China, North Korea, Southeast Asia, and the rest of Asia. It is easy to predict that

there will be debates on whether to allow extension of Most Favored Nation tariff status for China, the wisdom of additional food and medical assistance to North Korea, and the prospects for free and fair elections in Cambodia. However, I believe the most important congressional interest in Asia will be related to an entirely new issue — the financial collapse that has swept through Asia.

The recent and serious financial crisis in Asia may require the Clinton Administration to ask a reluctant, potentially hostile Congress for new and additional support for the international financial institutions — particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) — that deal with this crisis.

I also predict that a secondary effect of this financial crisis will be congressional calls for tough trade actions against the nations of the Asia-Pacific region because of the rapidly growing U.S. trade deficit with the region. Some economists predict that our total merchandise trade deficit will be more than \$250 million in 1997, largely because of currency devaluations in South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan. Although a Republican-led Congress is not inclined to support blatantly protectionist legislation, I nevertheless believe increasing and appropriate pressure will be put on the President and his trade negotiators to show results for their so-called, highly successful trade strategy. ●

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## DEFINING A NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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*By Robert A. Manning  
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

*Concerns about a diminishing U.S. role in East Asia “are, at best, overdrawn, and perhaps the wrong way” to think about the U.S. role there, says Manning. The United States, he says, must increasingly act in the region as “a first among equals — no more and no less.” Manning, a former State Department adviser for Asian policy, is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed here are his own.*

It was a sign of the times in more ways than one when finance officials from 18 Asia-Pacific economies gathered in Manila last month and agreed on a U.S. proposal to allow the International Monetary Fund to take the lead, with backup funds available from Asian donors, to bail out troubled Asian banking systems. Slow to respond to the Thai financial crisis last July when Japan, China, and other regional players took the lead, the United States put forward an alternative to a Japanese initiative that sought less painful reforms from ailing countries seeking financial assistance.

The whole episode captures the emerging pattern of U.S.-East Asian relations: symbiotic ties, with the U.S. playing the leading role in an evolving partnership with East Asian actors. The challenge ahead, however, is to clearly define a new partnership for the 21st Century in both the security and economic realms.

Indeed, since the Cold War began to fade into history at the onset of the 1990s, fear of an American withdrawal from the region has been a constant refrain voiced by friends and allies. Concern that an America unburdened by the Cold War would turn inward at a moment when Japan and China were emerging as major powers has fostered an unwelcome hallmark of historic transition periods — uncertainty. No matter how many times U.S. officials have reaffirmed their commitment, no matter how much blood and treasure the United States has spent to safeguard its interests in Asia over the past half century, no

matter how successful East Asian economies appear to be, fear of a future absent a major American role has become part of the political landscape of the region. A congressionally driven tendency toward unilateral sanctions as a policy of first resort further confounds many in the region.

It is not the first time that concern about American retreat has rippled across the region. A similar mood prevailed in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in the mid-1970s. But this time there seems to be an overwhelming sense that a rapidly modernizing China, after nearly two decades of almost double-digit growth, is poised to displace the United States as the dominant regional actor. Then there is an economically potent Japan becoming a more independent actor, while America seems ever a less overwhelming and more distant presence, portending major shifts in the regional balance.

In a sense, Asian concerns are at once well-founded and wrong. They are well-founded because the 100,000 forward-deployed American troops, which the administration has made the measure of its security engagement in Asia, will certainly not be there forever. Moreover, a kind of post-Cold War confusion about the U.S. role in the world, seen as offering less and demanding more, has raised questions in many Asian minds about America's future in the region. At the same time, there is a certainty that China will be a dominant power and a considerable global force by the second quarter of the 21st century.

However, as with Mark Twain's classic retort that "the report of my death has been grossly exaggerated," reports of a declining American role in the Pacific are no less overstated. No doubt, Korean reunification — however it occurs — will be a strategic shock to East Asia sometime in the coming decade. An American security presence in a unified Korea would be problematic at best. What would be the mission of U.S. forces? Over time though, a reunified Korea would still be a mid-size power surrounded by major powers, and would most likely seek a new, close security relationship with the United States. Whatever form U.S.-Korean political-military relations take post-unification, a drawdown of American troops and a new security environment will raise questions and almost certainly lead to a rethinking of the current configuration of U.S. forces in Japan as well.

But Asian concerns about a diminishing U.S. role in the region are, at best, overdrawn, and perhaps the wrong way to think about the U.S. role in Asia. The form of U.S. security engagement in the Asia-Pacific region will undoubtedly change as the slow-motion transformation of the security dynamics in the region unfolds. A revolution in military affairs will change the way American military presence and force projection are defined. The 100,000 troop figure was a well-intentioned effort to symbolize American staying power. But it is U.S. net capabilities and political credibility that are the measure of Washington's commitment to the region, not the number of troops on the ground. Whether U.S. forces are based in Korea and Japan or in Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska, the substance of the United States as an Asia-Pacific power will remain. But in an Asia of more equal players — China, Japan, Korea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States will have to forge new, more equal partnerships that reflect the power realities of the region.

The underlying reality is that the United States has enduring — and growing — interests in the Asia-Pacific region. By virtue of history, geography, cultural ties, and economic imperatives, the fate of

the United States is inescapably bound up with that of Asia. It is not mere coincidence that the United States has fought three wars in the Pacific over the past 56 years. We have ignored or misread Asia only at our peril. Enduring American interests have been evident since the Clipper ship *Empress of China* sailed into Canton more than two centuries ago. Freedom of navigation, commercial access, and prevention of the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power or coalition all invoke vital American interests. These fundamental American interests will be no less vital in the next century.

In global terms, the stability and prosperity of the Eurasian landmass are the centerpiece of any definition of vital American interests. The demise of the USSR and communism in Europe makes a major conflict there highly improbable for a least a generation to come. But Asia — whose military spending now surpasses that of Europe, whose sense of historical grievance and mutual distrust looms large, where territorial disputes dot the landscape, and where there are few mediating regional institutions — remains a dangerous place. For the United States, the stake in Asian stability and prosperity remains large and growing.

Indeed, one does not have to herald a coming "Pacific Century" to see that Asia's emergence is shifting the center of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Just walk through the streets of Los Angeles, San Francisco, or Seattle and the pull of East Asia — and the trans-Pacific ties cemented by the fastest growing U.S. minority, Asian-Americans — are readily apparent. Even with its recent financial crisis, East Asia will almost certainly remain the fastest growing economy in the world, albeit at less miraculous rates over the next several years.

Certainly, U.S. trade with the Pacific Rim — which at \$510 billion in 1996 overshadowed that with Europe, accounting for more than one-quarter of U.S. global exports — continues to grow. Similarly, U.S. investment in East Asia exceeds \$110 billion, and East Asian investment in the U.S. is some \$125 billion. Japanese and

Chinese treasury note holdings are important to maintain U.S. financial balances. Moreover, Asia will account for some 70 percent in the growth of energy demand over the next two decades, posing new challenges to the environment and to global energy markets. In addition, the Pacific Rim features some of the world's largest military powers, and (if one includes India) four of the six major "poles" (the United States, Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and India) in the emerging multipolar world. Any American foreign policy which does not place Asia at the top of its priority list is setting itself up for failure.

In the face of these realities, continued multidimensional U.S. engagement in the region is essential to the well-being of both the United States and East Asia. The challenge is that the style and form of U.S. involvement in the region must adjust to the new reality of maturing partners. Yet the U.S. network of bilateral security ties, the linchpin of which is the U.S.-Japan alliance, remains the core of what is an informal security system in the region. Despite fledgling fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, a protracted debate over new multilateral institutions has yet to present even the germ of an idea of what an alternative might look like. Even the region's most developed forum, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, remains more a consultative group than a regional economic mechanism.

There are no instant answers to the key question of what the future economic and security architecture of the region should be. But what appears evident is that — crisis-by-crisis, concern-by-concern — this architecture is evolving as the Asia-Pacific undergoes a kind of slow-motion transformation. The oft-stated goal of a Pacific Community remains more of a hope than a reality in a region of diverse cultures, political systems, and values.

The United States needs to be guided by the realization that the emerging architecture will be one encompassing both balance and concert of powers, that increasingly the United States must act as a first among equals — no more and no less. No less important, Americans need to understand that the values they cherish are gradually taking hold in the region. Over the past decade, as economic dynamism produced middle classes in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, these new social forces demanded more political freedom and accountability.

This trend is unfolding at an Asian pace and rhythm. The biggest question is if, how, and when such trends may unfold in China. More than any other single factor, the outcome of China's historic transformation will shape the region's security and economic environments. The United States must have the patience and confidence to allow these trends to unfold in their own way. And Asia must have the confidence that America is wise enough to understand its enlightened self-interest. Out of such principles a new Asia-Pacific system of relations will gradually emerge. ●

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## TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY: PROMOTING REGIONAL PEACE, STABILITY

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*By Ralph A. Cossa  
Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS*

*Ongoing efforts in non-governmental, or “track two,” diplomacy in East Asia promote greater trust and understanding in the region while providing “benign cover” for governments to vet new policies and strategies, says Cossa. Groups such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), he notes, bring private and governmental efforts together to foster an expanded security dialogue.*

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*Cossa is executive director of USCSCAP and co-chairs CSCAP’s international working group on confidence- and security-building measures. He is a regular participant at the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and Kathmandu track two meetings.*

Region-wide multilateral security cooperation is a relatively new phenomenon in Asia, dating back only to the July 1994 creation by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which now brings 21 of the region’s foreign ministers together annually to discuss regional security issues.

At their first meeting, the ministers threw their support behind parallel non-governmental or so-called “track two” efforts — i.e., unofficial meetings, normally hosted by independent or quasi-governmental research institutes, that bring independent scholars and security specialists together with former and current defense and foreign ministry officials. The presence of government officials and specialists from government-sponsored think tanks, in each case participating in a private capacity, distinguishes track two gatherings from more purely academic (track three) settings.

These track two approaches complement official efforts and permit the exploration of new or potentially sensitive options without necessarily locking participants into established, rigid governmental positions. They are both a sounding board for potential government initiatives and a

vehicle through which security specialists and academicians from outside the government can expose officials to new ideas or approaches.

Within the Asia-Pacific region, there are an ever-increasing number of track two initiatives. Many are one-time or limited duration events; others are more institutionalized. Some deal with region-wide and even global issues, while others have a sub-regional focus.

One of the most ambitious sub-regional initiatives is the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). Its aim is to enhance mutual understanding, confidence, and cooperation through meaningful but unofficial dialogue among China, Japan, Russia, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. Unfortunately, North Korea has not participated in any of the seven formal NEACD meetings held to date, though it did attend a preparatory meeting in July 1993.

The NEACD has been fruitful nonetheless, bringing together senior officials and noted academicians or security specialists from the other five countries for dialogue on political, security, and economic issues of concern to all parties. This provides Russia with a constructive role in

Northeast Asian security affairs while also providing a venue for China and Japan to discuss their differing perspectives regarding regional security issues. NEACD study projects have examined mutual reassurance measures, defense information sharing, and regional energy cooperation.

Another promising track two initiative is the newly-formed Asia-Pacific Security Forum. Sponsored by the Taiwan Institute for National Policy Research, its agenda includes PRC-Taiwan cross-straits relations — a subject that is specifically not on the agenda of any dialogue in which mainland China security specialists formally participate. As a general rule, Chinese officials are prohibited, and Chinese security specialists are strongly discouraged, from participating even in general security discussions if Taiwanese officials or scholars are present or if cross-straits relations or other China “sovereignty issues” are being discussed. Many (myself included) would argue that this self-exclusionary policy works against China’s long-term interests and adds to the general lack of understanding and mistrust between Beijing and Taipei.

The United Nations is also involved in track two diplomacy in East Asia. Each year, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific sponsors an “unofficial” meeting in which regional scholars and government officials gather in Kathmandu, Nepal, to discuss various regional and global disarmament issues in what has become known as the “Kathmandu process.”

Other major track two initiatives include a series of Indonesian-hosted Workshops on the South China Sea that focus on technical issues among the various Spratly Island claimants and a Philippine-hosted series examining the security implications of conflict over these islands. Both are aimed at promoting greater understanding and cooperation in order to reduce the prospects of conflict in this potentially volatile area.

The most prominent regional track two mechanism is the Council for Security

Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which links regional security-oriented institutes and, through them, broad-based member committees comprised of academicians, business leaders, security specialists, and former and current foreign ministry and defense officials. CSCAP is comprised of 18 member/associate member committees from all the major Asia-Pacific nations plus representatives from several United Nations offices. Scholars and security specialists from Taiwan participate in CSCAP working group meetings in their private capacities, making this one of the rare venues where Chinese scholars from Taiwan and the mainland sit down to discuss security issues together (cross-straits issues presently are kept off the CSCAP agenda, however).

CSCAP, while predating the ASEAN Regional Forum, is now focusing its efforts on providing direct support to the ARF while also pursuing other track two diplomacy efforts. CSCAP took as its model the working relationship between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and ASEAN-ISIS (Institutes for Strategic and International Studies), a loosely structured linking of Southeast Asian track two institutes that have long supported ASEAN and now provide the core of CSCAP.

Several CSCAP issue-oriented international working groups have been established dealing with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, Maritime Cooperation, and Transnational Crime, all on a region-wide basis. A North Pacific Working Group is also examining frameworks for Northeast Asia sub-regional security cooperation. Among the products already produced by these working groups are draft guidelines for regional maritime cooperation and broad-based CSCAP Memoranda outlining how both CSBMs and comprehensive/cooperative security measures apply to the Asia-Pacific region.

CSBM working group participants have examined basic principles for regional confidence building; investigated the utility of the UN Register of

Conventional Arms to the Asia-Pacific region, while laying the groundwork for possible development of an Asian Arms Register; developed a generic outline for defense policy papers (“white papers”) to aid those regional states that have decided to produce or refine current versions of this transparency tool; and performed groundbreaking work on the development of multilateral approaches to nuclear safety and non-proliferation, to include the possible formation of an Asia-Pacific Atomic Energy Cooperation (PACATOM) mechanism.

CSCAP also has stimulated discussion and debate on the ARF’s possible future preventive diplomacy role. A September 1997 track two seminar, conducted on behalf of the ARF, provided a forward-leaning future vision and recommended steps for fulfilling it, thus setting the stage for future governmental deliberations.

This preventive diplomacy effort provides a working example of how tracks one and two complement each other — the ARF ministers at the track one level first identifying preventive diplomacy as a potential future role of the ARF and then calling for an independent track two assessment as to how to bring this about. Track two participants, not being bound by current government positions, have the license to pursue more innovative and forward-leaning approaches and solutions. Their recommendations are likely to be tempered, however, by their close association and familiarity with government thinking. This may make their advice less bold and imaginative than one might expect from a purely academic exercise. But, it also increases the likelihood that their recommendations will be implemented or at least seriously considered by regional policymakers.

In short, track two multilateral security mechanisms provide a forum in which to develop and promote trust and confidence, while at the same time serving as confidence-building measures in and of themselves. By their mere existence, they promote greater trust and understanding in the region. Multilateral forums also provide a venue for other regional actors to be heard on security issues that affect them all. Track two organizations can provide “benign cover” for governments to vet new policies and strategies in a more academic setting before making formal proposals.

Non-governmental organizations also can provide a voice to nations, territories, and regional groupings that, for a variety of reasons, might be excluded from official gatherings. It is only in track two settings that PRC specialists will discuss security matters with Taiwanese scholars while representatives from South and North Korea join others in discussing possible new Northeast Asia security architectures. Providing a venue for members from both divided nations to get to know one another better helps to lay the groundwork for future cooperation.

Asian multinational track two gatherings also contribute to a sense of regional identity and cooperation that can spill over into the political and economic spheres, just as growing political and economic cooperation has helped set the stage for an expanded security dialogue. To maximize the effectiveness of such efforts, close coordination and cooperation between track one and track two are essential, as is the integration of regional and sub-regional initiatives with broader global efforts. ●

## AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PUBLICS ASSESS SECURITY ISSUES

*By Alvin Richman, Senior Research Specialist  
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Recent polls show that the American and Japanese publics view relations between their two countries as fairly positive. The Japanese, however, are more confident than are the Americans of receiving military support from the other in case of a conflict in East Asia. Also, both publics view China as the most important country to watch during the next 20 years, but differ about which region or country contains the greatest military threat — the Korean Peninsula (for the Japanese public) or the Middle East (for Americans). China is ranked second by both publics as a likely military threat in the future.

These and related conclusions are based mainly on four separate public opinion surveys taken in 1997, each done simultaneously in the United States and Japan and containing identical questions: Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun (October), Wall Street Journal/Nihon Keizai Shimbun (May), Harris/Asahi Shimbun (April-May), and Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun (January-February). In addition, findings also are drawn from a Gallup/Japan Information Center survey of the U.S. public and elites in February, 1997, and from a Harris poll of the U.S. public alone in August, 1997.

### **U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ISSUES**

A large majority of the publics in each country support the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and expect it to last many years. While no more than one-fourth in either country favors complete withdrawal of U.S. military bases or forces from Japan, most Japanese favor reducing the number of U.S. bases and military personnel in Japan and oppose using Japan's military forces alongside U.S. forces to resolve a conflict in East Asia.

### **U.S.-Japan Security Treaty**

Nearly four-fifths of the publics in both the United States (79 percent) and Japan (76 percent) believe it is "necessary" for the two countries to maintain a security treaty, according to the May Harris poll. Nearly as many in each country are confident that the United States and Japan "will still be military allies 20 years from now," the May Wall Street Journal/Nihon Keizai Shimbun survey indicates.

Neither public, however, has been eager to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun polls have found that both the United States and Japanese publics predominantly favor the status quo regarding the U.S. military presence in Asia and Japan's military cooperation with the United States in Asia. (Roughly half of each public favors the status quo on both issues.) Few in the United States (12 percent) or Japan (4 percent) want the United States to increase its military presence in Asia, according to the October Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun survey, but sizeable minorities — 41 percent in Japan, 20 percent in the United States — favor reducing it.

### **U.S. Bases in Japan**

The Japanese public greatly prefers reducing U.S. forces in Okinawa (72 percent), rather than maintaining the status quo or withdrawing all U.S. forces immediately. The May Harris/Asahi Shimbun poll, as in previous surveys, shows that few in Japan (15 percent) or the United States (5 percent) favor immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Okinawa. At the same time, maintaining the status quo receives much less support in Japan (8 percent) than in the United States (48 percent). The poll also indicates that another 44 percent of Americans favor reducing U.S. forces and 5 percent favor withdrawing them.

## **U.S. Defense Commitment**

Two-thirds of the Japanese believe the United States would defend Japan from an attack by another country (66 percent vs. 26 percent who think the United States would not come to Japan's defense). Half of the American public concurs that the United States should defend Japan (49 percent vs. 33 percent who believe the United States should not do so), according to the October Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun poll.

## **Japanese Support of U.S. Forces in East Asia Conflict**

In its October survey, Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun questioned respondents about 12 different types of cooperation that Japan could provide to the United States "if war broke out near Japan and the U.S. took military action" to try to resolve the conflict. The cooperative actions approved most often by the Japanese were humanitarian in nature — "rescuing civilians and helping refugees" and "treating wounded soldiers." Fewer mentioned several combat-support functions — "refuel naval ships and aircraft," "provide military intelligence," "repair naval ships and aircraft," and "supply weapons and ammunition." Mentioned least often was "join combat operations." However, only 10 percent opposed any form of cooperation with the United States.

Should war involving U.S. military action break out on the Korean Peninsula, a sizeable majority of Japanese (65 percent) favor limiting cooperation with U.S. forces to "giving rear support without participating in combat operations." Only 4 percent approve Japan's participation in combat operations. Twenty-four percent oppose any kind of cooperation.

## **PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT AND IMPORTANCE**

The majority of Americans and Japanese having positive views of their bilateral relations has risen somewhat during the past several years, but remains considerably below levels recorded in the 1980s. At the same time, U.S.-Japanese relations

are considered to be as important as ever by both publics.

## **State of U.S.-Japan Relations**

The most recent poll on this issue — the October Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun survey — found that the publics in the United States and Japan view the bilateral ties between their two countries fairly similarly: Slightly more than two-fifths in each country regard the bilateral relationship as "good," while a small minority (13 percent in Japan, 6 percent in the United States) views it as "bad." About two-fifths in each country hedged, saying relations were "neither good nor bad."

## **Political Stance**

An August Harris poll asked U.S. respondents to rate Japan and 13 other countries along a four-point scale from "close ally" to "enemy" of the United States. Two-thirds view Japan positively — either as a "close ally" of (21 percent) or "friendly" toward (46 percent) the United States. Less than one-third view Japan negatively — either as "unfriendly" (20 percent) or as an "enemy" (7 percent) of the United States. Japan ranks ninth among the 14 countries listed on the poll — somewhat more negatively than the ratings for Germany (73 percent positive vs. 21 percent negative), but much more positively than the ratings for China (35 percent vs. 60 percent).

The October Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun survey asked U.S. and Japanese respondents to pick up to five countries (from a list of 26 countries) that they regard as "particularly trustworthy." The United States retained the top ranking it has held among Japanese since this poll was introduced in 1978. Forty percent of the Japanese public mentioned the United States — far ahead of every other country, including Britain (26 percent), Canada (19 percent), Australia (19 percent), China (9 percent), and South Korea (8 percent). In the United States, 11 percent of the public mentioned Japan, far below the percentages naming Canada (66 percent), Britain (49 percent), Australia (48 percent), Switzerland (31 percent), and France

(25 percent), but ahead of the Philippines (5 percent), China (4 percent), India (4 percent), South Korea (3 percent), Saudi Arabia (3 percent), and Russia (2 percent).

### **Perceived Importance**

The May Wall Street Journal/Nihon Keizai Shimbun poll asked respondents with which country or region (from a list of six) it will be “most important for (the U.S./Japan) to have strong diplomatic relations” over the next 20 years. China heads the list for both the U.S. and Japanese publics. Thirty-two percent of Americans mentioned China (up from 17 percent in 1995), considerably higher than the proportions naming Japan (15 percent), Europe (13 percent), Latin America (12 percent), Russia (11 percent), or Africa (8 percent). Fifty-six percent of Japanese mentioned China, and 25 percent named the United States.

A separate question on this poll asked which country, Japan or China, is the “leading nation in Asia” today, and which one will be 20 years from now. Three-fourths of the U.S. and Japanese

publics concur that Japan is the leading Asian country today. Twenty years from now, however, both publics give the edge to China. In the United States, 49 percent pick China compared to 43 percent who select Japan as the leading nation in Asia two decades hence. In Japan, 59 percent pick China while only 32 percent expect Japan to remain Asia’s leader.

### **Perceived Threat**

Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun, in October, asked which countries or regions (from a list of 14) may become a military threat to one’s own country. In the United States, the Middle East topped this list, being mentioned by 58 percent of the respondents, followed by China/Taiwan (48 percent), Russia (37 percent), North Korea (26 percent), Southeast Asia (18 percent), Japan (16 percent), South Asia (15 percent), and the Balkans (11 percent). In Japan, North Korea topped the list by far, being mentioned by 69 percent, followed by China/Taiwan (32 percent), Russia (23 percent), the United States (15 percent), and the Middle East (15 percent). ●

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## FACT SHEET: U.S., ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ALLIANCES

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*(Based on data from State and Defense Departments)*

### **U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE**

The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security came into force on June 23, 1960. Under the Treaty, Japan hosts a carrier battle group, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, the 5th Air Force, and elements of the Army's I Corps. Since the end of U.S. occupation in 1952, U.S. military forces in Japan have decreased from more than 260,000 to fewer than 50,000. More than half of them are stationed in Okinawa. Japan's Host Nation Support (HNS) — more than \$4 billion a year — helps to defray the costs of maintaining these forces in Japan.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have gradually expanded capabilities and assumed primary responsibility for the immediate conventional national defense. The SDF mission, which the United States supports, is the defense of Japan's homeland, territorial seas and skies, and sea lines of communication out to 1,000 nautical miles. As a matter of policy, Japan has forsworn nuclear armaments and forbids arms sales abroad.

The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of the defense of Japan and of U.S. security strategy in East Asia. In April 1996, during President Clinton's state visit to Japan, the president and Prime Minister Hashimoto issued a joint security declaration which noted the achievements of the bilateral alliance in promoting peace and stability for all nations in the Asia-Pacific region. In September 1997, the United States and Japan approved new guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. These new guidelines will facilitate greater cooperation in areas such as logistical support, and search and rescue operations following disasters. (State Department Background Notes: [http://www.state.gov/www/background\\_notes/japan\\_1197\\_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/japan_1197_bgn.html))

### **U.S.-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLIANCE**

The United States is committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and agreed in the 1954 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to help the Republic of Korea defend itself from external aggression. In support of this commitment, the United States currently maintains about 37,000 service personnel in South Korea, including the Army's Second Infantry Division and several Air Force tactical squadrons. To coordinate operations between these units and the 650,000-strong South Korean Armed Forces, a Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established in 1978. The CFC is headed by General John Tilelli, who also serves as commander in chief of the 16-member-nation UN Command (UNC) and the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK).

Several aspects of the security relationship are changing as the United States moves from a leading to a supporting role in the defense of the Republic of Korea. South Korea has agreed to pay a larger portion of USFK's stationing costs and to promote changes in the CFC command structure. On December 1, 1994, peacetime operational control authority over all South Korean military units, then still under U.S. operational control, was transferred to the ROK Armed Forces.

Throughout the postwar period, tensions have continued between the Korean governments, although the late 1980s and early 1990s saw some efforts to promote North-South dialogue and better relations. The United States believes that the question of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula is, first and foremost, a matter for the Korean people themselves to decide. The United States is prepared to assist in this process if the two sides desire.

In April 1996, President Clinton and ROK President Kim Young Sam announced a proposal for four-party talks (the U.S., ROK, DPRK, and China) with the goal of establishing a permanent peace mechanism to replace the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement. The opening plenary session of the talks was held in December 1997 in Geneva; a second session is scheduled to take place there on March 16, 1998. (State Department Fact Sheet: [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs\\_us\\_so\\_korea\\_relations.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs_us_so_korea_relations.html))

#### **U.S.-REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE**

Until November 1992, pursuant to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, the United States maintained and operated major facilities at Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval complex, and several small subsidiary installations in the Philippines. In August 1991, negotiators from the two countries reached agreement on a draft treaty providing for use of Subic Bay Naval Base by U.S. forces for 10 years. The draft treaty did not include use of Clark Air Base, which had been so heavily damaged by the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo that the United States decided to abandon it.

On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the bases treaty, and despite further efforts to salvage the situation, the two sides could not reach agreement. As a result, the Philippine government informed the United States on December 6, 1991, that it would have one year to complete withdrawal. That withdrawal went smoothly and was completed ahead of schedule, with the last U.S. forces departing on November 24, 1992. On departure, the U.S. government turned over assets worth more than \$1.3 billion to the Philippines, including an airport and a ship-repair facility. Agencies formed by the Philippine government are now converting the former military bases for civilian commercial use, with Subic Bay serving as a flagship for that effort. Discussions continue on the nature of a status of forces agreement appropriate to the post-bases era.

The post-U.S. bases era has seen U.S.-Philippine relations improve and broaden, focusing more prominently on economic and commercial ties while maintaining the importance of the security dimension. Philippine domestic political stability has resulted in increased U.S. investment in the country, while a strong security relationship rests on the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. (State Department Background Notes: [http://www.state.gov/www/background\\_notes/philippines\\_1197\\_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/philippines_1197_bgn.html))

#### **U.S.-THAILAND ALLIANCE**

The United States and Thailand are among the signatories of the 1954 Manila pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Article IV(1) of this treaty provides that, in the event of armed attack in the treaty area (which includes Thailand), each member would “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Despite the dissolution of SEATO in 1977, the Manila pact remains in force and, together with the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962, constitutes the basis of U.S. security commitments to Thailand. Thailand continues to be a key security ally in Asia, along with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. (State Department Background Notes: [http://www.state.gov/www/background\\_notes/thailand\\_1197\\_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/thailand_1197_bgn.html))

#### **U.S.-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE**

The Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) security treaty of 1951 bound the signatories to recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific area against any of them would endanger the peace and safety of the others. It committed them to consult in the event of a threat and, in the event of attack, to meet the common danger in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The three nations also pledged to maintain and develop individual and collective capabilities to resist attack.

In 1985, the nature of the ANZUS alliance changed after the government of New Zealand refused access

to its ports by nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered warships of the U.S. Navy. After extensive efforts to resolve the issue proved unsuccessful, the United States suspended its ANZUS security obligations to New Zealand in August 1986.

The U.S.-Australia alliance under the ANZUS treaty remains in full force. Defense ministers of one or both nations often have joined the annual ministerial meetings, which are supplemented by consultations between the U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific and the Australian Chief of Defense Force. There also are regular civilian and military consultations between the two governments at lower levels. The United States would welcome New Zealand's reassessment of its legislation to permit that country's return to full ANZUS cooperation. (State Department Background Notes: [http://www.state.gov/www/background\\_notes/australia\\_971100\\_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/australia_971100_bgn.html))

#### **THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND THE THREE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH CHINA**

In the February 28, 1972 Joint Communiqué between the United States and China, signed at the conclusion of President Richard Nixon's historic visit to China, the two countries noted the essential differences in their social systems and foreign policies and agreed that the following principles should apply to their mutual relations: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; non-aggression against other states; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.

On January 1, 1979, the United States changed its diplomatic recognition of China from Taipei to Beijing. In the United States-People's Republic of China Joint Communiqué that announced the change, the United States recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China. The Joint Communiqué also stated that, within this context, the people of the United States will

maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

On April 10, 1979, President Carter signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which created domestic legal authority for the conduct of unofficial relations with Taiwan. U.S. commercial, cultural, and other interaction with the people on Taiwan is conducted through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private non-profit corporation. AIT is authorized to issue visas, accept passport applications, provide assistance to U.S. citizens, and help American commercial and business interests on Taiwan. A counterpart organization, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), has been established by the authorities on Taiwan.

Following derecognition, the United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan but has continued the sale of defensive military equipment to Taiwan in keeping both with the Taiwan Relations Act and with the 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In the 1982 Communiqué, the United States stated that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan; that U.S. arms sales would not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years; and that the U.S. intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan. China, in the 1982 Communiqué, reiterated its policy of striving for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

Maintaining diplomatic relations with China has been recognized to be in the long-term interest of the United States by six consecutive administrations; however, maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is also in the U.S. interest. The United States is committed to these efforts because they are important for America's global position and for peace and stability in Asia. (State Department Background Notes: [http://www.state.gov/www/background\\_notes/taiwan\\_971100\\_bgn.html](http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/taiwan_971100_bgn.html))

## **COMMAND LOGISTICS GROUP, WESTERN PACIFIC SINGAPORE**

Singapore allows U.S. forces the use of its military facilities; a U.S. logistics coordinating unit, COMLOG WESTPAC, which serves U.S. forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific, is located in Singapore. COMLOG WESTPAC provides logistics and maintenance support to the Seventh Fleet ships in the Western Pacific area of responsibility. This includes administrative control and oversight of logistics ships assigned to the Seventh Fleet. COMLOG WESTPAC also coordinates the conduct of CINCPACFLT's bilateral exercise program in Southeast Asia. CINCPACFLT Webpage: <http://www.cpf.navy.mil/>)

## **AGREED FRAMEWORK WITH NORTH KOREA (DPRK)**

The United States and Democratic People's Republic of Korea began bilateral talks in spring 1993, which resulted in a framework agreement signed by representatives of both nations in Geneva on October 21, 1994. This Agreed Framework commits North Korea to freeze its graphite-moderated reactor program, which could be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons development. In return, North Korea will receive alternative energy, initially in the form of heavy fuel oil, and eventually two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors. The agreement also includes provisions for gradual improvement of relations between the United States and North Korea, and it commits North Korea to engage in South-North dialogue. A few weeks after the signing of the Agreed Framework, President Kim Young Sam loosened restrictions on South Korean firms desiring to pursue business opportunities with the North. Although North Korea has continued to refuse official overtures by the South, economic contacts appear to be expanding gradually. (State Department Fact Sheet: [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs\\_us\\_so\\_korea\\_relations.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs_us_so_korea_relations.html))

## **ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)**

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and then-South Vietnam to promote political and economic cooperation. The Bali Treaty, signed in 1976 by ASEAN heads of state in Bali, Indonesia, and considered ASEAN's foundation document, formalized the principles of peace and cooperation to which ASEAN is dedicated. Brunei joined in 1984, shortly after its independence from the United Kingdom, and Vietnam joined ASEAN as its seventh member state in 1995. Laos and Burma were admitted into full membership in July 1997 as ASEAN celebrated its 30th anniversary. Although Cambodia was also scheduled to join at this time, its admittance has been postponed due to recent turmoil in that country.

ASEAN commands far greater influence on Asia-Pacific trade and political and security issues than its members could achieve individually. ASEAN's success has been based largely on its use of consultation, consensus, and cooperation. (State Department Fact Sheet: [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs\\_asean\\_971106.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs_asean_971106.html))

## **THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM AND POST-MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE**

Since 1977, ASEAN has established dialogue-partner relationships with other countries with interests in the region, including the United States. In 1993, ASEAN took the lead in proposing the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to include the dialogue partners and some others. The inaugural ARF ministerial meeting, which was held July 25, 1994, in Bangkok, Thailand, successfully brought together foreign ministers from all the ASEAN countries, plus Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Laos, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, the United States, Vietnam, and 18 representatives from the European Union (EU), to discuss regional security concerns.

The Bangkok meeting established the ARF as the first region-wide multilateral forum for consultations at the government level on Asia-Pacific security issues. Since the Bangkok meeting, the United States has encouraged an active ARF work program, focusing on confidence-building measures, defense transparency, and peacekeeping cooperation. The United States sees the ARF as a useful forum for developing habits of consultation and dialogue to prevent future conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region.

ASEAN foreign ministers meet annually, usually in July, at the ASEAN ministerial meeting. The annual meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum follows the ministerial meeting. ASEAN then meets with its dialogue partners for a post-ministerial conference. Secretary Albright led the U.S. delegation to the July 1997 meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

In addition to the large annual meetings, ASEAN holds more than 260 other sub-dialogue and committee meetings during the year, as well as regular bilateral meetings with each of its dialogue partners. Intersessional ARF meetings on specific topics are also held throughout the year. (State Department Fact Sheet: [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs\\_asean\\_971106.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs_asean_971106.html))

## **THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC) PROCESS**

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is an important part of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Since its inception in November 1989, APEC has grown from an informal dialogue of 12 Pacific Rim economies to a major regional institution that coordinates and facilitates the growing interdependence of the Asia-Pacific region and works to sustain economic growth. The APEC process remains America's primary vehicle for advancing economic cooperation and trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region. (USIA Webpage: <http://www.usia.gov/regional/ea/apec/apec.htm>)

*The United States and Asia-Pacific Security:*  
ARTICLE ALERT

Ross, Robert S. WHY OUR HARDLINERS ARE WRONG (The National Interest, no. 49, Fall 1997, pp. 42-51)

U.S. policy has “made important gains in affecting Chinese behavior over a wide range of issues bearing on important American interests,” says Ross. Advocating continued U.S.-Chinese cooperation, he notes that “an adversarial relationship...will only become inevitable if one of the two sides insists on it. Given the consequences that would flow for all of East Asia, it would be disastrous if it were Americans who so insisted.”

Browne, Peter. THE RICE STALKS ARE RIPENING (New Statesman, July 18, 1997, pp. 18-19)

The author says that after 30 years of growth, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) “is a much more self-confident grouping, which believes it offers an alternative approach — not a blueprint, for the differences within ASEAN are significant, but a broad approach — to economic and political development.” Browne says he is optimistic about its future, stating that “ASEAN has shown during its third decade that it has the capacity to respond flexibly to the challenges of the post-Cold War world.”

Stuart, Douglas. JAPAN’S PLACE IN THE NEW ASIAN CONCERT (Japan Quarterly, July-September 1997, pp. 60-65)

A new system of regional security in Asia must be developed to replace the outmoded “San Francisco system” under which the United States maintains some 100,000 troops in the area, Stuart maintains. One alternative, he says, is development of “a form of moderate multipolar balancing, in which the actions of the participating states are influenced by certain shared values.” Stuart sees the need for close cooperation between Washington and Tokyo in bringing about the transformation, but he says that Japan will have to take the first step.

Mahbubani, Kishore. AN ASIA-PACIFIC CONSENSUS (Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 149-158)

The author says Asia can achieve greater political stability and economic development only if key actors in the region agree on a consensus for the future. First, he says, the current geopolitical order should remain static. Second, all key players in the region must develop a common understanding of the region’s constraints and realities, and finally leaders must realize that common elements of the region’s diversity must be drawn out to truly foster a sense of community.

Cummings, Bruce. FEEDING THE NORTH KOREA MYTHS (The Nation, vol. 265, September 29, 1997, pp. 22-24)

Cummings says the news media’s coverage of North Korea consistently fails to note the quiet resolution of many issues causing Washington-Pyongyang tension. For the first time, he notes, North Korea “wants Washington in — with food aid, economic support, light-water reactors — and not out, turning toward us to help it deal with a strong South Korea and the towering regional presence of Japan, with the USSR gone and China wavering.”

Marlay, Ross. CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE SPRATLY ISLANDS (Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 23, no. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 195-208)

Marlay looks at the challenges that will face the International Court of Justice when settling claims to the Spratly Islands by China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. He expresses the hope that “China will perceive so strong a stake in a normal relationship with the rest of the world that it will moderate its behavior to avoid stoking fears and provoking economic sanctions....The world will watch with interest as this drama unfolds.” ◎

*The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the home page of the U.S. Information Service:*  
<http://www.usia.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html>

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## *The United States and Asia-Pacific Security:* KEY INTERNET SITES

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*Please note that USIS assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below which reside solely with the providers.*

ASEANWEB  
<http://kelsey.abcompass.com/abc/abs/detail/1057.html>

The Asia Foundation  
<http://www.asiafoundation.com/>

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)  
<http://www.apecsec.org.sg/>

Asia Pacific Policy Program, Harvard University  
<http://www.ap.harvard.edu/ap/>

Asia Program, The Woodrow Wilson Center  
<http://wwics.si.edu/PROGRAMS/REGION/ASIA/ASIA.HTM>

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<http://asiasociety.org/>

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Asian Studies Center Backgrounders, Heritage Foundation  
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East Asia Nonproliferation Project  
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East Asian Programs and Institutes, Council on East Asian Libraries  
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U.S. Information Agency: The U.S. Commitment to Security in the Asia-Pacific  
<http://www.usia.gov/regional/ea/easec/easec.htm> ●